nLab EPR paradox

Contents

Context

Quantum systems

quantum logic


quantum physics


quantum probability theoryobservables and states


quantum information


quantum computation

qbit

quantum algorithms:


quantum sensing


quantum communication

Contents

Idea

The “EPR paradox” is an argument due to Einstein, Podoldsky & Rosen (1935) (historically perceived of as leading to a “paradox”) about fundamental properties of quantum mechanics related to quantum entanglement.

The argument begins by giving a necessary condition for a theory to be complete, that every element of reality features in the theory.

It goes on to note that for noncommuting operators/quantum observables, the wave function cannot simultaneously be an eigenstate for both. Hence, it is not the case that both quantities are represented in the theory. From this they conclude that either quantum mechanics is incomplete or else not both of the quantities are real.

The second part of the argument sees the famous example of an entangled pair of particles. The argument here now relies on what they take to be a sufficient condition for reality, that a quantity be predictable without disturbing the system. However, if I allow the two particles to travel far from each other, it appears that by making quantum measurements on one particle I can predict both of two noncommuting quantities of the other system (admittedly, not simultaneously) without disturbing it. Both quantities then are real.

Thus they conclude that quantum mechanics is not complete.

… Need to talk about separability and locality. Then link to Bell's inequalities.

References

The original article:

Review and discussion:

Background discussion with emphasis on quantum logic and Bell's inequalities:

See also:

Realization in experiment:

with massive bodies:

with Bose-Einstein condensates:

  • Paolo Colciaghi, Yifan Li, Philipp Treutlein, Tilman Zibold, Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment with two Bose-Einstein condensates [arXiv:2211.05101]

Last revised on July 13, 2023 at 17:16:39. See the history of this page for a list of all contributions to it.