There are several kinds of universes that one can consider in type theory.
A universe a la Russell is a type whose terms are types. In the presence of a separate judgment? “”, this can be formulated as a rule
Thus, the type formers have rules saying which universe they belong to, such as:
With universes a la Russell, we can also omit the judgment “” and replace it everywhere by a judgment that A is a term of some universe. This is the approach taken by the HoTT book and by Coq.
A universe a la Tarski is a type together with an “interpretation” operation allowing us to regard its terms as types (or “codes for types”). Thus we have a rule such as
We usually also have operations on the universe corresponding to (but not identical to) type formers, such as
with an equality . Usually this latter equality (and those for other type formers) is a judgmental equality. If it is only a propositional equality?,we may speak of a weakly a la Tarski universe.
Universes defined internally via induction-recursion are (strongly) a la Tarski. Weakly a la Tarski universes are easier to obtain in semantics; see model of type theory in an (infinity,1)-topos. They are somewhat more annoying to use, but probably suffice for most purposes.