Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) was an Oxford philosopher, one of the early exponents of ordinary language philosophy (see Tanney). He is particulary noted for his work on category mistakes (see Magidor).
…not only is it the case that category-propositions (namely assertions that terms belong to certain categories or types), are always philosopher’s propositions, but, I believe, the converse is also true. So we are in the dark about the nature of philosophical problems and methods if we are in the dark about types and categories. (Ryle 1938, p. 189)
Categories, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 38 (1937 - 1938), pp. 189-206.
The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson, 1949.
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