nLab possible-worlds and many-worlds -- references

Possible-worlds vs. Many-worlds

References which consider, in one way or another, the notions of

• possible worlds in epistemic modal logic

• many worlds in interpretations of quantum mechanics:

in relation to each other:

• Mario Bunge, Possibility and Probability, in: Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Interference, and Statistical Theories of Science, Reidel (1976) 17-34 $[$doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1438-0_2$]$

• Brian Skyrms, Part III of: Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 30 5 (1976) 323-332 $[$jstor:4319099$]$

• Paul Tappenden, p. 101 (4 of 17) in: Identity and Probability in Everett’s Multiverse, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51 1 (2000) 99-114 $[$jstor:3541750$]$

• Daniel Nolan, p. 22 of: Topics in the Philosophy of Possible Worlds, Routledge (2002) $[$ISBN:9780415516303$]$

• Rod Girle, Ch. 8 of: Possible Worlds, McGill-Queen’s University Press (2003) $[$jstor:j.cttq48cx$]$

• Simon Saunders, p. 196 in: Chance in the Everett Interpretation, in: Many Worlds?, Oxford University Press (2010) 181–205 $[$doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0008$]$

• Nuriya Nurgalieva, Lídia del Rio, Inadequacy of Modal Logic in Quantum Settings, EPTCS 287 (2019) 267-297 $[$arXiv:1804.01106, doi:10.4204/EPTCS.287.16$]$

• Alastair Wilson, p. 20 of: Modal Metaphysics and the Everett Interpretation (2006) $[$philsci:2635, pdf$]$

• Vladislav Terekhovich, Modal Approaches in Metaphysics and Quantum Mechanics $[$arXiv:1909.10046$]$

• Alastair Wilson, The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism, Oxford University Press (2020) $[$ISBN:9780198846215$]$

• Raoni W. Arroyo, Jonnas R. B. Arenhart, Whence deep realism for Everettian quantum mechanics?, Foundations of Physics 52 121 (2022) [arXiv:2210.16713, doi:10.1007/s10701-022-00643-0]

Beware that there is also

• Bas C. van Fraassen, Modal interpretation of repeated measurement, Philosophy of Science 64 4 (1997) 669-676 $[$doi:10.1086/392577, SEP review$]$

which, even if some vocabulary is superficially alike, does not refer either to modal logic nor to the many-worlds interpretation.