# David Corfield Gilbert Ryle

It has long been known that what a proposition implies, it implies in virtue of its form. The same is true of what it is compatible and incompatible with. Let us give the label “ liaisons ” to all the logical relations of a proposition, namely what it implies, what it is implied by, what it is compatible with and what it is incompatible with. Now, any respect in which two propositions differ in form will be reflected in differences in their liaisons. So two propositions which are formally similar in all respects save that one factor in one is different in type from a partially corresponding factor in the other, will have liaisons which are correspondingly dissimilar. Indeed the liaisons of a proposition do not merely reflect the formal properties of the proposition and, what this involves, those of all its factors. In a certain sense, they are the same thing. To know all about its liaisons is to know all about the formal structure of the proposition, and vice versa. Though I can obviously entertain or believe a proposition without having yet noticed all its liaisons. Indeed I must grasp it before I can consider them, otherwise I could not be the victim of antinomies. (Categories, pp. 204-205)

Continues by suggesting logical form is not enough, cf. Witt and colours, but a richer logic?

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