constructive mathematics, realizability, computability
propositions as types, proofs as programs, computational trinitarianism
In constructive mathematics, the law of double negation doesn’t hold, which means that the notion of negation doesn’t have the same properties as that in classical mathematics. The usual notion of negation of a proposition $P$ says that $P$ is negated or false if and only if $P$ implies falsehood, $\neg P \iff P \Rightarrow \bot$. But there is also a stronger notion of negation: The strong negation of $P$, if it exists, is a proposition $Q$ such that $P$ holds if and only if $Q$ is negated $P \iff (Q \Rightarrow \bot)$. $P$ is strongly negated or strongly false if the strong negation $Q$ holds ($Q \iff \top$). Since every propostion $P$ still implies its double negation, $P$ being strongly negated still implies $P$ being negated in the usual sense.
For example, there are two different notions of inequality in the real numbers in constructive analysis: there is the usual denial inequality $\neq$ defined by the usual constructive negation of equality $x \neq y \iff (x = y) \Rightarrow \bot$, and then there is a strong inequality $\#$ defined by the disjunction of the order relations $x \lt y$ and $y \lt x$, $x \# y \iff (x \lt y) \vee (y \lt x)$, which is a strong negation of equality in the sense that $x = y$ if and only if $x \# y$ is false. As a result, there are two ways to define, for instance, an irrational number: a weak version which uses the usual denial inequality with every rational number, and a strong version which uses the strong inequality with every rational number.
In the antithesis interpretation of intuitionistic logic, the strong negation of a proposition correspond to the negation of a refutative proposition in affine logic. Compare with the usual notion of negation of a proposition, which correspond to the negation of an affirmative proposition in affine logic.
The notion of strong negation is also important in giving examples of the antithesis interpretation of intuitionistic logic. In much of constructive mathematics, statements of interest seem to come in pairs, a statement $P^+$ that amounts to a constructive version of a well-known statement $P^{\mathrm{C}}$ from classical mathematics, and a statement $P^-$ that amounts to a constructive version of $\neg{P^{\mathrm{C}}}$, and which is equivalent to $\neg{P^+}$ in classical logic, but which is not the same as $\neg{P^+}$ in intuitionistic logic, and similarly for $P^+$ vis-a-vis $\neg{P^-}$.
For example, suppose there are predicates $P_0$ and $P_1$ each with strong negations $Q_0$ and $Q_1$. In the antithesis interpretation, there are two statements $P^+$ and $P^-$ one can make about these:
$P^+$ states that $P_0$ holds or $P_1$ holds, $P_0 \vee P_1$
$P^-$ states that $Q_0$ holds and $Q_1$ holds, $Q_0 \wedge Q_1$
These two statements are de Morgan dual to each other, and thus are classically the negations of each other, but neither is the negation of the other in intuitionistic logic.
Similarly, suppose there is a predicate $P$ indexed by elements $x$ of a set $A$, such that each $P(x)$ has a strong negation $Q(x)$. In the antithesis interpretation, there are two statements $P^+$ and $P^-$ one can make about these:
These statements are de Morgan dual to each other, and thus are classically the negations of each other, but neither is the negation of the other in intuitionistic logic.
Last revised on September 6, 2024 at 21:23:35. See the history of this page for a list of all contributions to it.