indiscernible sequence?
Morley sequence?
Ramsey theorem?
Erdos-Rado theorem?
Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games (back-and-forth games)
Hrushovski construction?
generic predicate?
Given a model of a (not necessarily complete) first-order theory , one can canonically associate theories and whose models are precisely the models into which embeds as a substructure and elementary substructure, respectively.
In the case of the latter, this gives a theory whose category of models is precisely the co-slice category of models under in .
Let be a first-order structure in the language . We obtain an expanded language by adding to new constant symbols for each , and is naturally an -structure by interpreting each new constant as its namesake. The elementary diagram of , written , is the set of all -sentences possibly using constants which are true in , i.e. the -theory of .
The quantifier-free diagram of , written , is obtained the same way as , but only allowing quantifier-free -sentences.
If models , then contains as an elementary substructure. If models , then contains as an induced substructure.
If we are given and as above, we simply obtain and as the union of (viewed as an -theory) with and , respectively.
A trivial example is ACF, the theory of algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero (in the language of rings). Since is the prime field of characteristic zero, any algebraically closed field models , and in fact since each element of is already definable in ACF, is just the quantifier-free part of ACF.
Let be the countable random graph. Since it is an omega-categorical structure, any countable model of will again be isomorphic to . This is not true if we replace with , since there are all sorts of ways to extend while ensuring it no longer satisfies the almost-sure theory of finite graphs. (For example, we could add a new vertex and connect it to all the vertices from .)
of the pointwise stabilizer of in into the full automorphism group of .
To add a distinct constant symbol to a theory is to adjoin a new global point to its syntactic category. This doesn’t do very much unless if you additionally specify its type, i.e. the ultrafilter of subobjects above it. When we pass to the quantifier-free diagram of a model, we specify constants named after the model up to quantifier-free types, and when we pass to the elementary diagram of a model, we specify constants named after the model up to complete types.
A first-order theory T eliminates quantifiers if and only if it is “substructure-complete”: given any model of and any substructure , is complete.
The process of passing from to (resp. ) is functorial in the way you would expect the process of passing from a category of models to a co-slice category of models to be on corepresenting objects.
That is (now eliminating imaginaries and working with the pretopos completions of syntactic categories): if is an -theory and is an -structure, and is an -theory over via an interpretation , then there are naturally-induced interpretations
and
The interpretation induces a “taking reducts” functor
We restrict to the full subcategory consisting of those models of embedding (resp. elementarily embedding) the structure . These are elementary classes, and so those full subcategories are sub-ultracategories of . The restrictions of are ultrafunctors
and
because already was, and so by Makkai’s strong conceptual completeness, must be reflected by the desired interpretations.
(That the latter functor is well-defined just follows from the fact that specifying an object and a functor naturally induces a functor on the co-slice categories . That the former functor is well-defined is less automatic but still trivial to check.)
For the property of a theory that is complete for all substructures , see substructure completeness.
For the property of a theory that is complete for all models , see model completeness.
Last revised on May 26, 2017 at 06:47:42. See the history of this page for a list of all contributions to it.