nLab
inconsistency

Context

Foundations

Type theory

natural deduction metalanguage, practical foundations

  1. type formation rule
  2. term introduction rule
  3. term elimination rule
  4. computation rule

type theory (dependent, intensional, observational type theory, homotopy type theory)

syntax object language

computational trinitarianism = propositions as types +programs as proofs +relation type theory/category theory

logiccategory theorytype theory
trueterminal object/(-2)-truncated objecth-level 0-type/unit type
falseinitial objectempty type
proposition(-1)-truncated objecth-level 1-type/h-prop
proofgeneralized elementprogram
conjunctionproductproduct type
disjunctioncoproduct ((-1)-truncation of)sum type (bracket type of)
implicationinternal homfunction type
negationinternal hom into initial objectfunction type into empty type
universal quantificationdependent productdependent product type
existential quantificationdependent sum ((-1)-truncation of)dependent sum type (bracket type of)
equivalencepath space objectidentity type
equivalence classquotientquotient type
inductioncolimitinductive type, W-type, M-type
higher inductionhigher colimithigher inductive type
completely presented setdiscrete object/0-truncated objecth-level 2-type/preset/h-set
setinternal 0-groupoidBishop set/setoid
universeobject classifiertype of types
modalityclosure operator monadmodal type theory, monad (in computer science)

homotopy levels

semantics

Contents

Idea

A system in formal logic is called inconsistent if it admits a proof of a contradiction (that is, usually, a proof of false, or an inhabitant of the empty type).

Accordingly an axiom is called inconsistent or to lead to an inconsistency if adding it to an (implicitly understood) ambient logical system makes that system inconsistent.

In most usual logical systems, it follows that an inconsistent system admits a proof of every proposition, by the rule ex falso quodlibet (which is just the elimination rule for the empty type). For this reason, sometimes (especially in type theory), the adjective “inconsistent” is used to mean a system with this property instead. If we want to distinguish, then a system which admits a proof of every proposition may be called trivial. Of course, a trivial system is inconsistent, but a paraconsistent logic can be inconsistent without being trivial.

Examples

Revised on September 20, 2012 18:12:16 by Urs Schreiber (131.174.190.192)