basic constructions:
strong axioms
further
The set-theoretic multiverse is a philosophical perspective on set theory, advocated by Joel David Hamkins, according to which
there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe.
This is in contrast to the “universe view”, which
asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer.
The set-theoretic multiverse is at least informally analogous to such categorical notions as Topos, the 2-category of toposes, with each topos regarded as a universe of (“variable”) sets. See at topos theory and at categorical logic for more on this.
In dependent type theory, the set-theoretic multiverse is given by the existence of multiple inequivalent models of set theory as types $V$ with well-founded relations $\in$, which are made into Tarski universes via the dependent sum type:
In addition, this extends to any other notion of set theory, such as the categorical models of set theory as well-pointed categories $\mathcal{E}$, which are made into Tarski universes by the hom-set
where $1:\mathcal{E}$ is the terminal separator of the category $\mathcal{E}$.
This all coexists with the usual type theoretic notion of universes of sets as Tarski universes $U$ with universal type family $T$ in which for every type $A:U$ in the universe, $T(A)$ satisfies UIP.
Joel David Hamkins: The set-theoretic multiverse, Review of Symbolic Logic 5 3 (2012) 416-449 [arXiv:1108.4223, doi:10.1017/S1755020311000359]
Claudio Ternullo, Maddy on the Multiverse, in: Reflections on the Foundations of Mathematics, Synthese Library 407 Springer (2019) [doi:10.1007/978-3-030-15655-8_3, pdf]
Last revised on July 27, 2024 at 17:45:27. See the history of this page for a list of all contributions to it.