basic constructions:
strong axioms
further
natural deduction metalanguage, practical foundations
type theory (dependent, intensional, observational type theory, homotopy type theory)
computational trinitarianism =
propositions as types +programs as proofs +relation type theory/category theory
In (modal) logic, a proposition is stable under a modality if . If is monadic?, then is stable iff for some .
(In terms of modal type theory and propositions as types this means that is a modal type.)
In intuitionistic logic, the default notion of stability is the double negation modality . Since regardless, is stable iff . Being stable is weaker than being decidable; however, if every proposition is stable, then every proposition is decidable and the logic becomes classical. (This is because is decidable iff is stable.) Double negation is monadic, so by the previous paragraph, is stable iff for some ; in fact, is stable iff for some . (I guess that this has to do with negation forming a monadic adjunction with itself, or something like that.) In the topological semantics? of intuitionistic logic (where propositions correspond to open sets), the stable propositions correspond to the regular open sets.
In the internal language of a category of sheaves , a proposition is -stable iff it is enough for to hold on a dense open subset of to be able to conclude that holds on the whole of . For instance, the proposition about a section of the sheaf of real functions on is -stable.
In the antithesis interpretation of intuitionistic logic into affine logic, there are two notions of propositions: the usual intuitionistic propositions, and the affine propositions, which are pairs of mutually exclusive propositions.
Every affine proposition is already double negation stable via the affine negation , since the affine negation is defined as swapping the two component intuitionistic propositions of the pair of intuitionistic propositions around, and swapping of pairs is an involution.
On the other hand, stability of intuitionistic double negation in the sense above is a little more complicated since there always exists affine propositions, such as the never provably true and never provably false affine proposition , whose intuitionistic propositions are not the negation of the other in the pair. Instead, given an affine proposition , one has to use the exponential conjunction and exponential disjunction , which are the modalities in the antithesis interpretation which gets the intutionistic negation out of the affine logic.
Now, in order for an affine proposition to be stable, we want to be equivalent to and to be equivalent to . In both cases, we already have intutionistic non-contradiction
by the definition of an affine proposition. In affine logic, this is equivalent to the following always true statements:
Thus, it suffices for the reverse implications in the intuitionistic logic:
The first implication says that a proposition is refutative, and is defined in the affine logic by . The second implication says that a proposition is affirmative, and is defined in the affine logic by . Thus, an affine proposition is intuitionistically double negation stable if it is both affirmative and refutative.
Andrew Swan, Double negation stable h-propositions in cubical sets, (arXiv:2209.15035)
Michael Shulman, Affine logic for constructive mathematics. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 28, Issue 3, September 2022. pp. 327 - 386 (doi:10.1017/bsl.2022.28, arXiv:1805.07518)
Last revised on June 2, 2026 at 23:02:52. See the history of this page for a list of all contributions to it.