Russell’s paradox is a proof of falsehood, rendering a certain class of formal systems (those including some kind of unlimited axiom of comprehension) “inconsistent” in the sense that they prove false, which by the law of ex falso quodlibet entails that they prove anything at all. Curry’s paradox is a direct proof of “anything at all” without the detour through falsehood. Thus, it applies more generally than Russell’s paradox, e.g. to theories lacking a notion of “false”, or to paraconsistent theories whose notion of “false” does not satisfy ex falso quodlibet.

Curry’s paradox does, however, still depend on the structural rule of contraction. Thus, it can be avoided by systems based on linear logic.

Argument

Let $P$ be any statement at all, and consider the set

$C = \{ x \mid (x\in x) \Rightarrow P \}.$

Then if $C\in C$, by definition we have $(C\in C) \Rightarrow P$, and hence by modus ponens we have $P$. Therefore, $(C\in C) \Rightarrow P$. But by definition this means that $C\in C$, and therefore (as we just proved) $P$.

Note that, if negation is defined as $\neg P = (P \Rightarrow \bot)$ for some notion of falsehood$\bot$, then Russell’s paradox is the special case of Curry’s paradox for $P=\bot$.

Last revised on August 27, 2018 at 02:18:32.
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